sun 1 eillance that engenders excessive secrecy and renders accountability mechanisms largely meaningless.
INTRODUCTION
What does it mean to maintain the mle of law, particularly when national security and counterterrorism policies are at issue? In its propagation of the "global war on terror" after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration was accused many times of behaving in a lawless fashion. 1 President Obama picked up on this theme, insisting early on that his administration would oversee a return to the primacy of the mle of law, regardless of whether the country viewed itself as being at peace or at war. 2 In doing so, Obama promised to restore the idea that the government should have limited power, should be held to account for its transgressions, and that the government's actions and the laws under which it acts ought to be transparent. 3 Yet the post-9/11 decision-making by both the Bush and Obama administrations has been characterized by excessive secrecy that stymies most effmis to hold the government accountable for its abuses. Pmticularly in the area of govemment surveillance, meaningful oversight has seemed impossible without the trigger of leaked information. The executive branch has consistently defended the legality and efficacy of these surveillance programs, insisting that the administration acts in accordance with the mle of law and that secrecy has been necessaty, and that leaks by govemment insiders have been criminal and counterproductive.
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Congress has enabled the executive branch to engage in widespread surveillance in the post-9/11 context and has not been able to compel the executive branch to make available information regarding its surveillance programs that could give any oversight effotis more muscle.
This paper considers the nature and effect of national security-related surveillance and accountability measures consttucted in the United States, the United Kingdom, and India since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 . In doing so, this paper questions whether accountability of government abuses in this area exist in a meaningful form, or if governments have coristmcted a post-9/11 legal architecture with regard to surveillance that engenders excessive secrecy in 1 The Bush Administration's common response was that its practices and policies indeed compmied with the law-its interpretation of the law. ways that render accountability mechanisms largely ersatz. Part I considers post-9/11 surveillance effmis in the United States and the legal architecture that has supported it. Part II questions whether the laws governing surveillance should legitimately be considered accountability mechanisms, or whether they instead mimic the rnle of law by becoming relevant only when leaked information becomes available. Part III uses a comparative lens to consider the systems of surveillance adopted by the United Kingdom and India-other democratic nations strnggling with security threats-and the efficacy of the accountability mechanisms in those nations. Part N concludes with an exploration of possible avenues for the limitation of and accountability over government surveillance.
I. THE LEGAL ARCHITECTURE OF U.S. SURVEILLANCE EFFORTS
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. surveillance efforts were ramped up, in part due to the perception that intelligence agencies failed to garner vital information that could have prevented the attacks. 5 There was significant disagreement as to whether the failure was due primarily to legal constraints 6 or primarily to an inability to synthesize and analyze the available intelligence accurately and thoroughly.
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The 9/11 Commission agreed with the latter view, concluding that the inability of intelligence agencies to learn about and prevent the attacks of September 11 was not attributable to a lack of legal authority. 8 Nonetheless, the legal and policy constraints on intelligence gathering were loosened significantly in the wake of the September 11 attacks. As discussed below, the PATRIOT Act arguably authorized the collection and storage of domestic telephony and internet metadata 9 and the collection and content searches 5 
See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 339-{50
(2004), available at http://www.9-I I commission.gov [hereinafter 9/11 Commission Report] (discussing the inability of U.S. intelligence agencies to synthesize relevant data prior to the September lith attacks). 6 See Testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2 (Apr. 13, 2004), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/hearings/hearingl 0/ashcroft_statement.pdf (noting that " [t] he single greatest structural cause for September II was the wall that segregated criminal investigators and intelligence agents. Government erected this wall. Government buttressed this wall. And before September II, government was blinded by this wall"). 7 See Testimony of substantial amounts of foreign telephone and internet communications, 10 thereby giving the intelligence community a much larger "haystack" of information from which to attempt to glean details of emerging and ongoing terrorist tlu·eats.
11 This shift generated critiques from civil libertarians and lawmakers, 12 but critics have been largely unable to secure significant and lasting victories in curtailing surveillance powers, either tlu·ough judicial action 13 or legislative initiative. However, the tenor of the public debate became more contentious in June 2013, when then-National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden began revealing classified documents detailing the scope of NSA surveillance on foreign and U.S. persons in order to prompt public scrutiny and debate over the programs. Snowden revealed, among many other things, that the NSA was engaged in the practice of collecting and retaining the metadata of all U.S. telephone customers for five years (the "NSA Metadata Program"), and had been running searches through that metadata when there was a "reasonable, articulable suspicion" that a particular telephone number was associated with potential terrorist activity.
14 · This program-with its broad scope, lack of pa1iicularized suspicion, and lengthy duration of data retention-provides a useful vehicle tlu·ough which to analyze the question of meaningful accountability over warrantless government surveillance more generally. 15 Snowden's revelations over the year following the publication of his initial disclosure continued to foster debate and demands for 10 See Uniting FORBES (June 12, 2013) , http://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/20 13/06/12/the-effectiveness-of-smallvs-big-data-is-where-the-nsa-debate-should-start/ (discussing need to understand whether a larger or smaller "haystack" of data better enables intelligence-gathering and analysis efforts). 15 Of course, the U.S. intelligence community has engaged in numerous programs involving warrantless surveillance, and this paper only addresses the bulk metadata collection that is arguably authorized under Section 215 of the Pattiot Act. Other warrantless surveillance-of non-U.S. persons or on non-U.S. tetTitmy-falls under the auspices of other authorities, such as Executive Order 12333 or Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Those surveillance and data collection efforts are beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, the structural accountability questions raised with regard to the NSA Metadata Program can be extrapolated to consider other domestic surveillance questions because of analogous legal and political frameworks.
51:1 better oversight of the NSA. 16 The administration initiated various review mechanisms, 17 Congress convened oversight hearings, 18 and the public engaged in a vigorous debate as to the legality, efficacy, and morality of the NSA's activities, particularly the bulle collection and retention for several years of telephony and internet metadata of U.S. persons. This collection has been described at times as lawless, 19 yet the architecture constructed to support arguments as to the domestic legality 20 and constitutionality of the NSA Meta data Program is extensive. On a purely constitutional level, some have asserted that inherent Article II power confers on the executive branch expansive surveillance powers based on a view that the United States continues to be on a post-9/11 war footing. NSA surveillance and data collection has been expansive during both the Bush and Obama administrations and has been supported by tremendous amounts of law constmcted by the executive branch and Congress and constmed by the courts to enable smveillance with little meaningful oversight. As such, we are left to question whether the legal architecture provides the constraints on government necessaty to satisfy the basic tenets of the mle of law or, instead, if the legal architecture mimics and ultimately undermines efforts to uphold the rule of law.
Snowden's revelations with regard to a variety of surveillance activities, including the NSA Metadata Program, provoked anger from a wide and bipartisan swath of the U.S. public. This in turn forced the Obama administration, Congress, and the courts to respond as to the roles of the various branches of government in ensuring control and accountability over NSA surveillance.
The Obama administration offered a multifaceted response: defending the efficacy, legality and necessity of the NSA Metadata Program/ 2 claiming that current accountability mechanisms were adequate, 33 and ordering reviews that allowed for the possibility of curtailing and/or creating additional accountability safeguards over aspects of the NSA Meta data Program. 34 Members of Congress varied in their reactions with regard to the NSA Metadata Program: some defended the legality, necessity and efficacy of the program, 35 while others were energized by the public disclosure to push for additional safeguards for civil liberties.
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The FISC, normally insulated from public view, came under scmtiny as the judicial entity tasked with safeguarding civil liberties. As such, FISC judges were put on the defensive as to whether or not their decisions effectively prevented or curtailed unlawful or unconstitutional smveillance and, thereby, genuinely upheld the rule of law. 31 
A. Administration Claims of Accountability
In the months after the Snowden leaks in 2013, the Obama administration sought to emphasize several aspects of the NSA's work with regard to the public debate: the danger that transparency could compromise the utility of the NSA's surveillance efforts; 37 the efficacy of the NSA Metadata Program in securing intelligence essential to detect and dismpt tenorist threats; 38 and the fact that there had been very few abuses of the power granted to the NSA. 39 The administration insisted that it had shared a relatively full account of the NSA Metadata Program with Congress prior to Congress's reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act in 2011, 40 underscoring its claim that the NSA was not acting as a rogue agency. The level of actual congressional knowledge as to the scope and depth of the program remains unclear. In August 2013, various members of Congress from both major political parties attested that they had never been given the infonnation at issue and had voted on PATRIOT Act renewal without a satisfactmy understanding of the NSA surveillance program, arguably because the heads of intelligence committees in Congress had chosen not to share that information with members not serving on those panels. 41 On the other hand, it was likely a matter of political self-interest for members of Congress to deny knowledge 37 17-18 (2008) . The diffusion of responsibility within the national security bureaucracy, combined with the lack of transparency of action, also contributes to a sh·uctural inability to hold responsible individuals accountable for abuses of power. See PAUL C. LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT: FEDERAL HIERARCHY AND THE DIFFUSION OF ACCOUNTABILITY 62, 86-87 (1994) . 38 See August 2013 Remarks by the President, supra note 32. During this press conference, President Obama noted the efficacy of the surveillance programs arguably authorized under various sections of the Patriot Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: "[M]y detetmination was that the two programs in particular that had been an issue-215 and 702-{)ffered valuable intelligence that helps us protect the American people, and they're worth preserving"); see also Glennon, supra note 26, at 26-27, 29 (discussing the structural incentives for national security administrators to exaggerate the nature and scope of threats to U.S. security). 39 See August 2013 Remarks by the President, supra note 32. President Obama insisted that the surveillance programs were not being abused and were being adequately overseen by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("What you're hearing about is the prospect that these could be abused. Now part of the reason they're not abused is because they're-these checks are in place, and those abuses would be against the law and would be against the orders of the FISC"). 40 See Weich, supra note 25 (outlining the bulk data collection conducted by the government pursuant to Section 215 of the Patriot Act and with the permission of the FISA court). 41 of a program of which they had a general understanding, but was deeply unpopular with much of the public after the Snowden disclosures.
As the disclosures and public critique continued, the Obama administration promised to increase accountability and transparency of the NSA Metadata Program, first by announcing the creation of the Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies. This program was established by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper. 42 The announcement expressed the purpose of the review group as assessing whether surveillance technology was being used in a way that optimized national security and the advancement of U.S. foreign policy interests, "while appropriately accounting for other policy considerations, such as the risk of unauthorized disclosure and our need to maintain the public trust." 43 The Review Group issued a lengthy report in December 2013 that focused on proactive suggestions, among them that the bulle collection and storage of meta data ought to remain in the possession of an entity outside of the government, that the statutory framework under the PATRIOT Act Section 215 be amended to require FISC authorization for the NSA to conduct searches within the bulk metadata, that more information regarding intelligence gathering should be disclosed to Congress and the public, that more consistent and rigorous accountability measures ought to be implemented, and that non-U.S. persons ought to be afforded more protection from potential U.S. government overreach.
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In Januaty 2014, President Obama, citing the need for continued oversight of intelligence agencies while defending the need for bulk data collection and for the secrecy surrounding that program, announced that various aspects of the NSA Metadata Program and other intelligence gathering initiatives would change to improve privacy safeguards for U.S. and non-U.S. persons. 45 President Obama further stated that a number of FISC opinions would be declassified and made public, and that transparency would become a priority for intelligence agencies.
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Shortly after this speech, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, an independent body within the executive branch whose establishment was recommended by the 9/11 Commission, issued a detailed report in which it concluded that the PATRIOT Act did not provide a statutory basis for the bulle collection and retention of telephony metadata, that the NSA Metadata Program raised constitutional concerns, and that it could find no significant evidence in 42 See James R. Clapper, DNI Clapper Announces Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE (Aug. 12, 2013), http:/ /www.dni.gov/index. php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-20 13/909-dni-clapperannounces-review-group-on-intelligence-and-communications-technologies. 43 Jd. Nowhere in this atmouncement were individual privacy, civil Iibeliies, and constitutional rights addressed. 44 See PRESIDENT support of the efficacy of the program in dismpting and preventing terrorism threats.
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In late March 2014, the Obama administration announced that it would propose legislation to dismantle the bulk collection program, leaving metadata in the exclusive possession of telecommunications companies and requiring FISC authorization prior to the NSA accessing the metadata. 48 The type and scope of legislative restrictions were debated extensively in 2014, but no bill was passed, leaving open the question of whether any additional legislative control will be exerted by Congress-if not, the status quo of executive control over the scope and intrusiveness of the program will continue. 49 Section 215 of the Patr·iot Act, arguably providing statutory authorization of the NSA Metadata Program, is set to expire in July 2015, a deadline that is sure to prompt legislative debate on whether to renew the program, cmtail the authority granted to the administration, or eliminate the program altogether. The effect of any legislation in cmtailing intrusive surveillance practices is yet to be seen, but the fact that the administration has already shifted its public willingness to improving protections of privacy and civil libetties and increase transparency when compatible with intelligence gathering interests, is noteworthy as well. 50 Assessment of whether those changes will be meaningful must wait for further developments, particularly as it may be institutionally and politically difficult for the president and Congress to shift course dramatically in the face of still-existing terrorist threats and the political pressure created by the public perception of those threats.
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The primary message from the Obama administration since the Snowden disclosures has been that the administration itself is best suited to address whether and to what extent any recommended changes to NSA surveillance were appropriate, 52 and that the Snowden disclosures themselves have been unnecessaty, press-office/20 14/05/28/remarks-president-west-point-academycommencement-ceremony ("Our intelligence community has done outstanding work, and we have to continue to protect sources and methods. But when we cannot explain our effmis clearly and publicly, we face terrmist propaganda and intemational suspicion, we erode legitimacy with our partners and our people, and we reduce accountability in our own government."); see also id. ("[W)e're putting in place new restrictions on how America collects and uses intelligence-because we will have fewer partners and be less effective if a perception takes hold that we're conducting surveillance against ordinary citizens."). 51 See Sudha Setty, National Security Interest Convergence, 4 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 185, 188-189 (2012) (highlighting the political danger of being viewed as "soft on terror"); see also Glennon, supra note 26, at 66 (asserting that presidents rarely change course dramatically in the arena of foreign affairs because of the deep entrenchment of beliefs and positions among experts and policy makers). 52 See Glennon, supra note 26, at 40.
illegal, and counterproductive to both the intelligence gathering programs themselves and the public discourse. 53 However, there is no indication that any of the accountability measures now being promoted by the administration would have existed or gained significant purchase but for the Snowden public disclosures. 54 The various institutional accountability mechanisms that currently exist within the executive branch do not appear to be equipped to consider concerns stemming frorn intelligence community insiders who have a fuller understanding than the public of the scope and nature of surveillance programs and who question the basic premise or constitutionality of programs such as the NSA metadata collection. To the contrary, there are indications that some within the NSA have actively attempted to avoid oversight by the Department of Justice. 55 The Office of the Inspector General for the NSA, appointed by and reporting to the director of the NSA, 56 is suited to deal with allegations of statutory and policy compliance violations, but not with a large scale systemic complaint about privacy and accountability such as that of Snowden.
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Other potential avenues for accountability, such as the Office of the Inspector General for the Defense Department, are rendered irrelevant by the lack of information access.
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In fact, the extreme secrecy that surrounded these surveillance programs, even within the administration, suggests that many existing executive branch mechanisms were, in the time before the Snowden disclosures, not engaged in effective oversight. 53 See, e.g., Jamtmy 2014 Remarks by the President, supra note 45. 54 Snowden provided written testimony to the European Parliament stating that he had attempted to discuss his concerns with regard to various aspects of NSA surveillance with superiors within the NSA prior to his public disclosure, but that his efforts were either ignored or rebuffed. 15, 2007) , http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-brokeprivacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/20 13/08/15/331 Oe554-05ca-ll e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story.html (stating that NSA operatives requesting permission to extend surveillance to a new target were instructed to limit the information disclosed to Justice Depmiment "overseers"). 56 Commentators have suggested that an independently appointed and overseen Inspector General for the NSA would provide a better avenue for accountability. See Britt Snider & Charles Battaglia, The National Security Agency Needs an Independent Inspector General, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www. washingtonpost. com! opini ons/nati onal-securi ty-agency-needs-an-independent-inspectorgeneral/20 13/09/26/ae3 7 d7fc-25f4-11 e3-ad0d-b7 c8d2a594b9 _story.html. 57 See Interviews with NSA officials (various dates, on file with author) (discussing the fact that the job of the NSA Inspector General would not have been to discuss the "philosophical differences" that Snowden had with the NSA's programmatic and policy choices). The Inspector General for the NSA has publicly stated that if Snowden had complained to the Inspector General, his allegations would have been investigated thoroughly. DaiTen Samuelsohn, NSA Watchdog: Snowden Should Have Come to Me, POLITICO (Feb. 25, 2014, 6:37PM) http://politi.co/NvvjAE. But it seems quite likely that the extent of the Inspector General's inquiry would have been to examine the program against the existing statutory authority and find that the bulk data collection was statutorily authorized. 58 See Spencer Ackerman, Pentagon Watchdog 'Not Aware' ofNSA Bulk Phone Data Collection, GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2014, 3:36 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/18/pentagonwatchdog-nsa-bulk-phone-collection (stating that the Defense Deparhnent Deputy Inspector General was unaware of the bulk data collection until learning about itthrough the June 2013 Snowden leaks).
B. Congressional Efforts at Oversight and Accountability Enforcement
The extent of congressional knowledge regarding the NSA Metadata Program is not fully known to the public and has been the subject of significant debate. Nonetheless, even assuming that Congress was sufficiently informed as to the potential reach of the PATRIOT Act with regard to surveillance 5 9 and, therefore, that the statutory authority for the bulk data collection and storage was sound, the ability of Congress to effect significant and meaningful ex post oversight appears to be severely limited.
Historically, congressional hearings and investigations have been a powerful tool to rein in executive branch overreaching. 60 However, it seems that the extreme secrecy surrounding the NSA surveillance programs undermined the efficacy of these oversight powers, to the point that they may have been reduced to an ersatz form of accountability. One prominent example stems from a Senate oversight hearing on March 12, 2013, in which Senator Ron Wyden specifically asked Director of National Intelligence James Clapper if the NSA was systematically gathering infonnation on the communications of millions of Americans.
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Clapper denied this, yet subsequent revelations confirmed that the broad scope of the data collection included metadata for telephonic communications, as well as content data for emails, texts, and other such writings. 62 After public discussion of the discrepancy in his testimony, Clapper commented that he gave the "least most untmthful" answer possible under the circumstances. 63 Senator Wyden expressed disappointment and fi·ustration that even while under oath at an oversight hearing, Clapper misled the Senate. 64 The ability for congressional oversight is further hampered by a general lack of access to information about the details of the NSA Meta data Program 65 and 59 See Weich, supra note 25 (discussing the need for Congress to be sufficiently informed such that it could renew Section 215 of the Patriot Act in 2011). 60 These examples are not determinative, but taken together, they raise significant doubt to the extent of accurate infmmation regarding surveillance programs being made available to congressional oversight committees, and whether the oversight committees can function as effective accountability measures 69 without the benefit of illegally leaked information such as the Snowden disclosures.
C. Judicial Review
Two fmms of relatively weak judicial review exist over the NSA Metadata Program. The primary mechanism by which the NSA has legitimated its surveillance activities is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), a closed, non-adversarial setting. Article III courts have had the opportunity to consider post-9/11 surveillance programs on numerous occasions, and with few exceptions, Article III courts have refused to review matters of national securityrelated surveillance.
I. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
The FISC differs from Article III courts in numerous ways: Its statutory scope is limited to matters of foreign intelligence gathering; its judges are appointed in the sole discretion of the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court; its proceedings are secret; its opinions are often secret or are published in heavily 66 press-releases/wyden-udall-statement-on-reports-ofcompliance-violations-made-under-nsa-collection-programs (noting that the disclosures of thousands of violations by the NSA are ']ust the tip of a larger iceberg" and that they are prohibited fi'om discussing the further problematic aspects of the NSA surveillance program by Senate rules). 67 See Gellman, supra note 55 (noting that Senator Feinstein only leamed of the audit from the Washington Post). 68 See NSA Report on Privacy Violations in the First Quarter of 2012, WASH. POST (last visited Mar. 1, 2015), available at http:/lapps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-repmi-on-privacyviolations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/; Gellman, supra note 55 (providing and detailing the audit that found 2,276 violations of the NSA's own rules in several surveillance locations); see also Ellen Nakashima, Lawmakers, Privacy Advocates Call for Reforms at NSA, WASH. PosT (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/lawmakers-privacy-advocates-call-forreforms-at-nsa/2013/08/16/7cccb772-0692-ll e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story.html (stating that the White House emphasized that although there were a small number of "willful" transgressions, most were unintentional). redacted form; and its process is not adversarial as only government lawyers make arguments defending the legality of the surveillance being contemplated. 70 Many of these differences bring into doubt the legitimacy of the court, its ability to afford adequate due process regarding civil liberties concerns, and its ability to uphold the rule of law in terms of government accountability. Compounding this legitimacy deficit is the FISC's own loosening of the relevance standard under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act such that the FISC has found that bulk data collection without any particularized threat or connection to terrorism is legally permissible.
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Historically, the FISC has rejected NSA surveillance applications too infrequently to be considered a substantial check on government overreach as an ex ante matter.
72 As an ex post matter, it is unclear to what extent the FISC's work guarantees any meaningful accountability over NSA surveillance activities. On the one hand, because the FISC lacks an adversarial process and has no independent investigatmy authority, the FISC only addresses ex post compliance problems when the government itself brings the problem to the comt's attention. 73 As such, FISC judges rely on the statements of the government as to the govemment's own behavior and lack the authority to investigate the veracity of the government's representations.
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For example, in 2011, the FISC found one aspect of the surveillance program~brought to its attention months after the program went into effece 5 ~to be unconstitutional. 76 Additionally, in one declassified opinion, the FISC critiques the NSA's sloppy over-collection of metadata of U.S. communications, and questions the efficacy of bulk data collection as a national security measure. 77 At one point, the FISC sanctioned the NSA for overreaching in 70 , http://www. washingtonpost.cornlpolitics/court-ability-to-police-us-spying-programlimited/2013/08/15/4a8c8c44-05cd-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story.html (citing U.S. district judge Reggie Walton and noting that "the court lacks the tools to independently verify how often the government's surveillance breaks the court's rules ... [and] it also cannot check the veracity of the goverrunent's assertions that the violations its staff members report are unintentional mistakes"). 75 See Gellman, supra note 55 (noting that the FISC decision was issued in October 2011, months after the program had been initiated). 76 saving all metadata and mnning daily metadata against an "alert list" of approximately 17,800 phone numbers, only 10% of which had met FISC's legal standard for reasonable suspicion. 78 On such occasions, the adminish·ation has modified problematic aspects of the surveillance and continued forward without further impediment by the FISC.
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On the other hand, the fact that the NSA itself has brought potential compliance incidents to the notice of the FISC 80 indicates at least some internal policing of these programs. However, this is hardly an effective substitute for external review and accountability mechanisms that would ensure that consistent controls are in place. Further, the self-repmting of these compliance incidents does not in any way allow for discourse over the larger stmctural questions surrounding the surveillance programs.
Finally, the ability of the FISC to act as an effective check on NSA oveneaching is severely limited by the secrecy and lack of information available to the FISC judges. Judge Reggie B. Walton, formerly the Chief Judge of the FISC, lamented that "[t]he FISC is forced to rely upon the accuracy of the information that is provided to the Court .... The FISC does not have the capacity to investigate issues of noncompliance .... " 81 The ability of the NSA to not only gather and retain bulk metadata, but also to build in backdoor access into data files despite private encryption efforts has been largely sanctioned by the FISC based on NSA representations as to the seriousness of the security threats posed to the nation. 82 In an enviromnent in which there is a tremendous fear of being held responsible for any future terrorist attack that might occur on U.S. soil, 83 http://www. washingtonpost. com/politics/full-text-of-president -o bamas-j an-1 7 -speech-on -nsareforms/20 14/0 l/17/fa33590a-7f8c-11 e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html (noting that the NSA worked under the concern that if another terrorist attack occurred, the NSA might be held responsible, President information deficit for those outside of the intelligence community, the FISC has consistently deferred to the NSA's assertions and has not been able to act as an effective accountability mechanism.
Article III Courts
Article III courts have consistently been waty of wading into the debate over surveillance, almost always dismissing cases in the post-9/11 context on procedural or secrecy grounds, 84 despite 85 the net effect of precluding even those individuals with concrete evidence that their privacy and civil liberties had been infringed from having their grievances heard. 86 Although the Snowden disclosures have given more purchase to plaintiffs challenging data collection and surveillance, some Article III comts continue to find that plaintiffs have no grounds to stop the NSA' s data and meta data collection, retention, and analysis.
The case of Clapper v. Amnesty International, 87 decided in early 2013, prior to the Snowden disclosures, exemplifies the traditional lack of relief available to plaintiffs in Article III comts. In Clapper, plaintiffs, including attorneys, nonprofit humanitarian organizations, and journalists, alleged that their ability to communicate with and advise overseas clients and sources was severely compromised by the fact that their phone calls were likely being surveilled by the NSA or other U.S. government agencies. The United States Supreme Comt dismissed plaintiffs' suit on standing grounds, holding that plaintiffs "cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending." 88 Immediately after Snowden's June 2013 disclosures that the telephony data of all U.S. persons is being systematically collected and stored by the NSA, the ability of plaintiffs to clear the procedural hurdle of standing improved, since the "fears of hypothetical future harm" that allowed the Clapper majority to dismiss that case were no longer hypothetical, but publicly known as fact. However, the question of whether plaintiffs were granted any substantive relief is yet to be determined, since district comts have come to differing conclusions on the question of the metadata collection program's constitutionality.
Obama mentioned this pressure overtly; it is certainly plausible that the members of the FISC view themselves under similar pressure). 84 95 Judge Leon used these distinctions of both scope and depth of surveillance to establish that the NSA meta data program constituted a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.
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In a particularly remarkable analysis, Judge Leon reasoned that the continuously expanding use of technology in the everyday lives of most Americans justified a greater expectation of privacy over information that is shared electronically, not an ever-shrinking realm of protection over personal privacy. 97 Having established that a search occurred, Judge Leon considered the plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunctive relief, finding that there was a 89 )) (holding that plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of privacy over telephone metadata, such as the telephone numbers of calls dialed from or received by his home telephone, since that information had been voluntarily shared with a third party, the telephone company). 93 See id. at *35. The court further rejected plaintiffs' First Amendment claim on both standing and substantive grounds, holding that any chilling effect on plaintiffs' conmmnications was based on their own "speculative fear" that their data was being reviewed by the NSA, not simply collected like that of every other U.S. dissent, in which he opined that "unless a person is prepared to forgo use of what for many has become a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance." 442 U.S. at 750 (refening to the govemment's argument that by using his home telephone, Smith had assumed the risk of government surveillance) (internal citations omitted). significant likelihood that the plaintiffs would succeed in demonstrating that the surveillance and searches were unreasonable and, therefore, unconstitutional. To do so, he touched upon the intrusive nature of the search and, differing significantly ft·om Judge Pauley in Clapper II, found that the govemment had not made a showing that the NSA Meta data Program was necessary to the govemment' s counterterrorism efforts.
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Klayman offers some reason for optimism among civil libertarians: Not only did an Article III comi decide a post-9/11 abuse of power case on its merits, but that decision held that the NSA surveillance at issue was likely in violation of the Fomih Amendment. Whether appellate courts will follow the line of reasoning in Klayman as opposed to that of Clapper II and Smith, however, remains unclear.
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It is also difficult to predict how the U.S. Supreme Comi will respond when confronted with this matter. On the one hand, individual members of the Court have expressed skepticism as to the appropriateness of judicial review in matters of national security-related surveillance. 100 On the other, the Court as a whole has recently shown significant interest in rethinking the parameters of govemment surveillance. In the 2012 case United States v. Jones, the Court found that warrantless GPS tracking of an individual's movements for an extended period of time contravened the parameters set in Smith.
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The two concurrences in Jones further suggested reworkings of the Smith framework in light of changing technology and an increased need for robust privacy protection given the government's ability to access telephonic data with ease. 102 The opinion in Klayman focused on Jones to illustrate the need to rethink the nature and scope of privacy given the vastly different use of technology of today as compared to the 1970s, when Smith was decided. 103 In mid-2014, the Supreme Court followed this rights-protective line of reasoning when it decided Riley v. California, holding that wanantless searches of the electronic contents of an anestee's cell phone were in 98 ld. at 61. 99 [W]hether the NSA can do the stuff it's been doing ... which used to be a question for the people . . . will now be resolved by the branch of government that knows the least about the issues in question, the branch that knows the least about the extent of the threat against which the wiretapping is directed. se1zure. These rights-protective perspectives-offered by justices with different political and theoretical perspectives-may offer a preview of a significant jurispmdential shift not only in hearing security-related cases on their merits, but in finding for plaintiffs alleging privacy and civil liberties infringements. However, the historically deferential attitude of comis toward matters of national security, a stance that has only compounded in the post-9/11 context, suggests that this may continue to be an uphill battle for civil libertarians.
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More troubling to proponents of the efficacy of existing legislative and executive accountability mechanisms are the disclosures made by Snowden. These mechanisms were revealed to be either theoretical or passive until significant leaks forced a public discourse that demanded a more active accountability regime. In fact, the federal government exploited the lack of transparency and effective accountability mechanisms until the stmi of the Snowden disclosures to secure dismissals like that in Clapper I and to circumvent efforts of criminal defendants to discover whether they had been actually surveilled.
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Reliance on sporadic leaks to trigger genuine accountability is stmcturally problematic.
107
Our reliance on leaks thus far should force us to reconsider the extreme secrecy under which intelligence-gathering programs, like the NSA Metadata Program, are administered, and to consider means by which institutional actors can exert meaningful and regular oversight and control over these programs. Such change would force politicians to take ownership over secret counterterrorism programs, weighing their expediency against possible constitutional defects or the judgment of public opinion. An atmosphere in which accountability mechanisms are not merely ersatz pending an illegal leak could provide space for genuine public discourse and at least the possibility of greater protection of civil liberties.
III. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SURVEILLANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Both the United Kingdom and India have stmggled greatly with establishing effective surveillance mechanisms and with maintaining privacy rights and civil liberties. As democracies with a shared legal background and ongoing intelligence sharing, yet with different govenunent and accountability stmctures, these nations provide useful comparisons to the United States in terms of examining the efficacy of counterterrorism surveillance and the concomitant strength of accountability measures and safeguards.
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A. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has been dealing with internal and external security threats for decades. Shortly after the end of World War II, the United Kingdom recognized the dual needs of access to global intelligence and protection of its own privacy interests from the intelligence-gathering operations of enemies and allies alike. Thus, in the early Cold War era, the United Kingdom and United States entered into what is now known as the UKUSA Agreement, which structured intelligence sharing and prohibited spying on each other.
108 This relationship has grown over the decades, and remains a strong one. However, U.K. legislative and judicial responses to terrorism and security-related threats have evolved in a somewhat different direction, reflecting domestic statutes and couti decisions that are responsive to both internal politics and pressures as well as European Unionlevel mandates on counterterrorism activities and constraints on intrusions into the private lives of individuals living within the European Union.
109
Although the NSA Metadata Program has garnered significant global publicity and criticism, telecommunications providers within the European Union have been collecting and retaining E.U. telephonic and Internet metadata for extended periods of time since at least 2006. This collection has been a topic of much discussion and has spawned multiple directives within the United Kingdom and by the European Union. This practice and has recently been discontinued. Tracing how the United Kingdom's domestic counte1ierrorism agenda, including bulk metadata collection, has developed in conjunction with and in response to EUlevel directives, sheds light on an alternative approach to balancing security needs and accountability on these matters.
The United Kingdom's Regulation of Investigative Powers Act ("RIP A"), implemented in 2000, authorized a significant amount of domestic and external data collection, but also instituted some safeguards to protect privacy interests.
110
Among these was the creation of the Investigative Powers Tribunal, which was granted jurisdiction over individual complaints related to the conduct of intelligence services.
111
In 2002, the European Union adopted a Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communicationsn 2 that, among other things, ensured that the privacy of individuals using telephones and the internet to communicate was maintained even in light of rapidly evolving technology, and mandated the destruction of data held by telecommunications companies and internet providers after billing and other such purposes had been fulfilled. The directive amended previous directives and mandated, in accordance with the principle of proportionality and with respect for individual privacy, that domestic telephonic and internet metadata be retained by telecommunications companies for law enforcement and countetienorism investigatory purposes for six to twenty-four months.
115
Because of the systematic data retention mandated by Directive 2006/24/EC and the extensive and intrusive surveillance technology known to be used by the government, 116 numerous parliamentary committees have undertaken investigations of the surveillance apparatus in the United Kingdom. A broad investigation by the Constitution Committee led to findings in 2009 that the intelligence-gathering services were largely compliant with the law, but that report included numerous recommendations for changes to surveillance authority and transparency. Among the recommendations were giving greater consideration to civil liberties before implementing further smveillance programs, 117 granting greater authority to various commissioners to exercise increased oversight, 118 revisiting existing legislation to increase specificity in the smveillance authority, 119 and making the work and role of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal more visible to the public.
120
Since the tribunal operates and deliberates in secret, offers limited procedural and substantive rights, and has never ruled in favor of a complainant, the tribunal is open to critique that, like the FISC in the United States, it merely rubber stamps decisions made by the intelligence agencies and masks a lack of genuine accountability for government abuse of civil libetiies. ns ld., art. 5 (describing categories ofmetadata to be retained); id. art. 6 (mandating retention for at least six months and not more than two years). It is notewotihy that the United Kingdom, along with 15 other members of the European Union, declared its intention to postpone application of the directive to intemet data; Declaration by the United Kingdom pursuant to Article 15(3) of Directive 2006/24/EC. 116 See Clive Walker, Championing Local Surveillance in Counter-Terrorism, in Fergal Davis, et aJ., SURVEILLANCE, COUNTER-TERRORISM AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 24 (2014) (describing the U.K. government's "all-risks surveillance" approach to detecting terrorism threats before they are actualized).
ll? Constitution Committee, Second Report, Surveillance: Citizens and the State, 2008-9, H.L.l8-I, '1]'1]11 0, 144; see also id. '1]307 (recommending that the government amend the Data Protection Act 1998 to require the issuance of an independent, public, and detailed Privacy Impact Assessment prior to the adoption of any new surveillance or information collection). 118 Id. hearing. 122 However, because the tribunal only acts when a complaint is brought to it, even if it were functioning in a fair and impartial manner, it is structurally unable to act as a comprehensive check on government abuse.
123
As in the United States, the Snowden disclosures that began in June 2013 prompted additional reviews of the various programs in which British intelligence agencies were involved, including those that related to telephonic and Internet data collection and retention. Among the Snowden disclosures were: the extent to which the United Kingdom's signals intelligence organization, Government Communications Headquarters ("GCHQ"), worked with the NSA on counterencryption efforts used in the United States, United Kingdom, and elsewhere; 124 the progress of GCHQ' s own counterencryption effmt; 125 GCHQ 's receipt of data from the NSA's PRISM program to intercept and store data from internet service providers; 126 and GCHQ's interception and storage of images from webcam chats. 129 Intelligence Services Act, 1994, c. 13 (U.K.). This act authorizes the activity of secret intelligence surveillance for national security purposes and requires minimization procedures to limit the impact of surveillance on privacy rights. See id. § § 1-3. 130 See RIPA, supra note 110, §1(1) (authmizing the interception of communications for certain purposes). RIPA further authorizes the interception of external communications if warranted by the Secretary of State, as was the case with regard to the Prism program. See id. § § 8(4)-(5). 131 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.). The aim of this Act is to give domestic effect to the rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights. 51:1 GCHQ's actions with regard to PRISM were compliant with the statutory framework, but concluded that the parameters of surveillance authority required additional specificity and consideration.
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That reconsideration of potential reforms to cmiail authority was taken up by a variety of legislators but did not gain significant purchase in Parliament.
Further frustrating the cause of civil libertarians is the fact that, under RIP A, the sole recourse for challenging such actions under U.K. law is making a claim to the Investigatmy Powers Tribunal. While the Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR") into U.K. domestic law, thus permitting the judiciary to declare incompatibility if it believes that a national security measure is incompatible with the ECHR standard, this does not constitute a mandate that the domestic security apparatus change its policies. 133 As such, review at the domestic level has often been sharply curtailed, and review at the supranational level potentially offers a more fmitful avenue to pursue civil libe1iies claims.
Although the Treaty of the European Union provides that "national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State,"
134 the question of how to resolve conflicts between domestic security measures and the robust privacy and dignity protections under various European Union conventions and treaties is complicated and to some extent remains unresolved. The European Convention on Human Rights provides a number of protections for individuals, including the right to respect for an individual's private and family life, his home, and his correspondence. 135 However, that provision is followed by a caveat that allows for wide latitude for government intmsions on privacy when they are "in accordance with the law and [are] necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the countly, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
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This national security exception is broadly enough drafted such that it may, in many instances, swallow the privacy right altogether. 136 Jd. art. 8(2).
broad privacy protections in matters that touch on the areas of freedom, security, and justice. 139 Likewise, the previously discussed 2002 E.U. directive lays out the impmiance of protecting privacy and confidentially of electronic communications, 140 but also allows member states to create policies that undercut those protections if necessary to safeguard national security and public safety, among other exceptions.
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Following this pattern of allowing broad privacy protections to be compromised for national security purposes, case law before the European Court of Human Rights has made clear that privacy rights can be curtailed for the sake of counte1ierrorism effmis.
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In this patchwork of protections and compromises, various bodies within the European Union are attempting to react to the Snowden disclosures. Soon after the disclosures regarding the scope and invasiveness of GCHQ intelligencegathering, the European Parliament began to step up its consideration of how much primacy to give privacy concerns, and U.K. plaintiffs 143 began the process of seeking relief from surveillance and the collection of meta data from the European Court of Human Rights. 144 A suit currently pending queries whether Aliicle 8 of the ECHR has been abrogated by the actions of GCHQ. decision, the ECJ made clear that the protection of privacy rights needed to increase along with the online presence of most individuals and the concomitant power of the government to surveil them. 148 The suit pending at the European Court of Human Rights and the ECJ decision in the Digital Rights case offer a strong indication that supranational review on the surveillance regimes of member nations may yield significant protections for individual privacy rights. In some ways, these cases follow on ECJ decisions over the last several years that affirm human rights even when conflicting national security policies are asserted as necessary by the national governments of member states. 149 Yet the decision in Digital Rights may not necessarily translate into nullification of meta data collection and retention in individual nations, such as the United Kingdom, particularly given the leeway that individual member states have in implementing protections under the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as the likelihood of the intelligence community to exploit ambiguities in the patchwork of domestic and E.U. law and regulations. 150 Further, we are still left with the question of whether these direct accountability mechanisms, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal on the domestic level or the availability of bringing suit before the European Comi of Human Rights, actually provide meaningful accountability and constraint on government surveillance without the existence of leaked information like that supplied by Snowden in 2013. These reactive mechanisms would not have been triggered without leaked information; combined with a permissive legislative framework for surveillance and the secrecy surrounding surveillance activities in the United Kingdom, those interested in learning more about the scope and depth of surveillance activities and challenging those activities may still need to rely on leaked information to trigger mechanisms that could help promote the rnle of law.
B. India
The authority of Indian intelligence agencies to conduct wanantless surveillance and data collection is long-standing and broad, and does not include effective checks-judicial or otherwise-to control against potential abuse. Authority for current policies of wanantless wiretapping and surveillance, like many of India's countelierrorism authorities, finds its roots in colonial-era legislation that was meant to control the Indian population and prevent possible subscribers was being made available in a way that impermissibly interfered with the right to respect for private life and the protection of personal data. ld. uprisings against the British colonial government.
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The Indian Telegraph Act of 1885 specifically authorizes the interception and storage of telegraph messages by the central or state govemments in times of "public emergency, or in the interest of the public safety" if it is deemed necessaty or expedient to do so "in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence." 152 This pennissive language set the stage for over a century of legislation, executive action, and judicial permission that enabled broad surveillance of all forms of telecommunications, even in peace time, so long as such surveillance has a security-related nexus.
The Indian govemment has continued to focus on national security threats since its independence in 194 7; as such, India's legal security framework includes constitutional, executive, and statutory emergency powers. 153 Indian authorities also depend on non-emergency criminal ordinances and laws that authorize broad police powers that in many ways minor emergency and countertenorism-related powers. This conflation of various legal bases for authority---constitutional emergency powers, counterterrorism law, and criminal law-into one system has led to an extraordinary amount of power being granted to intelligence and countertenorism authorities 154 as long as they have articulated that their actions are being taken for the benefit of national security. 155 Broad countetienorism powers, including surveillance authority, have incrementally increased over time. 156 In the last fifteen years, this dynamic can be traced both to perceived domestic intelligence failures and the shifts in the intemational community in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. The Kargil Conflict of 1999, precipitated by the Pakistani militaty crossing the Line of Control 157 and involving several months of warfare between Pakistan and India before the restoration of the Line of Control, prompted investigation as to how the Indian intelligence community could use surveillance technology to act preventatively against potential military and/or terrorism threats. 158 The post-conflict analysis by the Kargil Review Committee noted the need for the Indian government to not undervalue intelligence analysis to prevent even an unlikely attack. 159 The lack of ability to analyze relevant information and to share that information among intelligence agencies, the military, and law enforcement were seen as serious obstacles that needed to be resolved, 160 and the Indian government looked to increase its technological intelligence-gathering capabilities to improve the chances of forestalling another Kargil-type conflict. 161 However, the Kargil Review Committee observed that the cost in human and material resources required to "plug all conceivable loopholes to frustrate every eventuality, howsoever foolhardy ... would have been neither militarily nor politically cost-effective." 162 The Committee went fmiher to note that if the government were to adopt a zerotolerance stance toward such attacks, this would have invited legitimate criticism as to resource allocation and would have weakened the ability of India to defend itself effectively against Pakistan. 163 In the end, the post-Kargil analysis did not emphasize a need for greater legal authority for surveillance. Instead, the focus was on technological expetiise and better infonnation sharing within the government.
Yet two years after the Kargil Conflict, the events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent international pressure to strengthen domestic counterterrorism efforts, including surveillance, intelligence-gathering, and intelligence-sharing, led to significant statutory reform in India. 164 The Parliament of India passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (POTA) partially in response to the United Nations Security Council's Resolution 1373 and its global mandate to fight terrorism. 165 POT A laid out specific procedures for requesting the interception of telecommunications of tenorism suspects that required some reasonable suspicion on the part of investigators. 166 When POTA was repealed in 2004 as part of a political pledge to deal with human rights abuses, intelligence agencies could still rely on the broad surveillance powers authorized by the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885 to collect and analyze telephony and electronic data as related to security matters.
The govemment expanded these powers after the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, 167 when it quickly passed counte1ienorism legislation that broadened and made permanent the powers previously granted under POTA, as well as amended the Information Technology Act 2000. These amendments allowed for surveillance of all digital communications of all individuals within India, regardless of whether security threats were at issue. 168 The amendments also made clear that the scope of wanantless surveillance authority includes all types of telephony data and internet data, as distinguished from the metadata collection authorized by the United States and United Kingdom.
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By 2009, the govemment had leveraged the authority granted in 1885 and 2008 to am10unce creation of the Central Monitoring System (CMS), a data collection and analysis system meant to capture all electronic data throughout India.
170
The parameters of this program are secret and, despite efforts to create privacy legislation that could work to curtail the reach of the CMS and to challenge the constitutionality of the CMS in court, it continues to operate without extemal oversight.
171
Given the deference of the Indian judiciary with regard to national security initiatives and the ongoing attacks that have buoyed public suppmi for extremely strong counte1ienorism powers, it is unclear whether the Indian judiciary would find a constitutional violation in the type of surveillance authorized under the 2008 amendment to the Information Technology Act, or that which is perhaps taking place under the CMS. On one hand, the Supreme Comi has previously interpreted Aliicle 21 of the Indian Constitution, which a1iiculates the fundamental right to life, as including privacy of persons and personal thought. 172 The Court has used its interpretation of A1iicle 21 as the basis for inferring the need for procedural safeguards against potentially abusive and overly intmsive surveillance. 173 However, the Indian judiciary has historically been extremely deferential to legislative and executive decision-making on counterterrorism matters, even when human rights and civil liberties are at stake, 174 making the courts a largely unreliable source of rights-protective constraints. 175 
IV. INCREASING REAL ACCOUNTABILITY
The comparative analysis in the previous sections of this paper reveals some conunon themes: ever increasing technological capabilities of the intelligence community; sustained pressure to use that technology to prevent terrorist plots from developing; broad, conflicting, and sometimes unclear legal authorities to conduct massive surveillance and data collection; the intelligence community leveraging lack of transparency to maximize its surveillance; and the question of whether existing accountability measures in the United States, the United Kingdom, and India are sufficient to maintain the rnle of law and protect individual rights.
Although many of the challenges in these nations are the same, the paths toward genuine accountability differ based on the current level of transparency, the types and strength of review mechanisms available, and the public support for mass data collection and surveillance. In India, there appears to have been a modest degree of transparency regarding mass data collection: The Indian public, politicians, and the judicimy have long understood that the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885 authorizes such collection when the government can articulate a security nexus. Further, unlike the somewhat vague language of Section 215 of the Patriot Act, the power granted under the Information Technology (Amendment) Act of 2008 is clear in its scope, and the Indian government itself announced the roll-out of the CMS.
However, the precise scope of actual data colle9tion and surveillance remains murky, especially as the intelligence community's capabilities have increased with programs such as the CMS. It is yet to be seen whether objections to the intmsiveness of the CMS will resonate with Indian politicians such that comprehensive privacy legislation is enacted and parliamentmy oversight of surveillance programs is strengthened, or with the Indian judiciary such that the previous articulation of the right to privacy under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution will protect against the type of massive data collection capable under a fully operational CMS. In some respects, this depends on the views of the Indian public and the willingness of the judiciary to engage in security matters in a way that would break with its highly deferential past.
In the United Kingdom, a different set of avenues for accountability exists. The opinion in the European Court of Justice Digital Rights case includes strong language on the need to dismantle systemic metadata collection and storage in order to preserve fundamental privacy and dignity rights of individuals. This shift, along with other recent movement on privacy rights, suggests institutions at the European level are at the forefront of protecting privacy over electronic data. However, the lack of transparency as to what programs are actually in place presents a knotty problem: If the United Kingdom continues domestic metadata collection practices in secret based on its interpretation that security-related policy cannot be dictated at the European level, is there any accountability measure in place that could forestall it? The domestic Investigative Powers Tribunal would not review mass collection if it were not brought to the attention of a complaining party. Likewise, Europeanlevel judicial review would depend on a public understanding of the scope and type of surveillance at issue. Without a Snowden-like disclosure to enable such review or a strong commitment by the United Kingdom to abide by the human rights standards mticulated at the European level, parliamentary oversight would be the key mechanism to protect against oveneaching by the British intelligence community, akin to the legislative oversight stmcture in India.
Although Congress could launch a large-scale investigation into the programs Snowden disclosed, like the Church Committee in its time, 176 its ability to serve effectively as an ongoing accountability mechanism over intelligence gathering in the manner of a parliament seems unlikely. For the political and stmctural reasons discussed above, the appamtus of national security policy-making is somewhat intentionally insulated from Congress. On the one hand, the benefit of this structural arrangement is that it may facilitate expertise and efficient decisionmaking, but a key effect is also that this apparatus is not really accessible to the other branches of government or the public.
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This consolidation of decisionmaking authority in the executive branch, plus the difference between congressional and parliamentary access to executive branch information, accounts for a different potential for legislative oversight in the United States as compared to the United Kingdom and India. Fmther, the lack of widespread and sustained public pressure 12, 2014), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/why-we-need-new-church-committee-fix-our-brokenintelligence-system. Schwarz, who served as chief counsel to the Church Committee, argues that the type of deep, wide-access investigation that the Church Committee undertook served the purposes of uncovering illegal government behavior, increasing self-policing and the inculcation of best practices among government agencies, and restoring public confidence in the government as being bound by laws. /d. Senator Frank Church, chair of the Church Committee, recognized the inability to maintain accountability over NSA activities fi·om within the administration:
"[The NSA's] capability at any time could be turned around on the American people, and no American would have any privacy left, such [is] the capability to monitor everything: telephone conversations, telegrams, it doesn't matter. There would be no place to hide .... I know the capacity that is there to make tyranny total in America, and we must see to it that this agency and all agencies that possess this technology operate within the law and under proper supervision, so that we never cross over that abyss. 178 toward reform suggests that a meaningful increase in legislative oversight of the intelligence community will not occur in the near future.
Leaks like that of Snowden, combined with rigorous and responsible press coverage, can provide some level of constraint on and accountability over intelligence community activity. 179 However, the tendency toward public inertia and the possibility that democratic institutions will not actually provide a substantive check on the surveillance apparatus 180 suggest weakness in relying solely on this approach. Further, the crackdown on leaking and the treatment of whistleblowers as criminals, even prior to Snowden's disclosures, 181 combined with heightened security measures, means that reliance on leaking as a meaningful structural check is misplaced.
Tinkering with the structure inside of the NSA also seems to achieve more in terms of burnishing a veneer of accountability rather than creating genuine oversight. It is hard to understand how various proposed reforms, such as appointing a civilian to oversee the NSA 182 or creating a more adversarial internal review process within the NSA, 183 would increase accountability and transparency. For the executive branch, it seems more likely that pressure from business and corporate interests trying to retain consumer business 184 may shape NSA parameters for mass data collection and domestic surveillance in some respects, 185 but will likely not lead to institutional or stmctural changes as to the government's approach to surveillance without additional pressure from the public. One promising move with regard to oversight and transparency has been the establishment and staffing of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB). 186 This board, tasked with assessing many aspects of the government's national security apparatus both for efficacy and for potentially unnecessary incursions into civil liberties, has a broad mandate and, compared with many national security decision makers, significant independence from the executive branch. 187 Retrospectively, the PCLOB has, among other things, issued the highly critical report of the NSA Metadata Program in January 2014 that led to further public pressure on the Obama administration to curtail this program; it is promising that the PCLOB's prospective agenda includes futther analysis of various surveillance programs. 188 However, the PCLOB's potential influence in protecting civil rights may be limited by its position: The PCLOB is an advisory body that analyzes existing and proposed programs and possibly recommends changes, but it cannot mandate that those changes be implemented. The ability to have a high level of access to information surrounding counterterrorism surveillance programs and to recommend changes in such programs is important and should be lauded, but over-reliance on the PCLOB's non-binding advice to the intelligence community to somehow solve the accountability and transparency gap with regard to these programs would be a mistake.
For example, on prospective matters, it is likely that intelligence agencies would consult the PCLOB only if the agency itself considers the issue being faced new or novel, as the NSA metadata program was labeled prior to its inception. In such cases, decision makers within an agency generally ask whether the contemplated program is useful or necessary, technologically feasible, and legal. If all three questions are answered affirmatively, the program can be implemented. Now that the PCLOB is fully operational, it seems likely that if a contemplated program is considered new or novel, an intelligence agency would consult the PCLOB at some stage of this process for its guidance on implementing the program. This nonpattisan external input may improve self-policing within the 51:1 intelligence community and help intelligence agencies avoid implementing controversial programs or, even if implemented, set better parameters around new programs.
189
If the PCLOB is able to exert some degree of soft power in influencing national security decision-making, then the judicimy represents hard power that could be used to force the protection of civil liberties where it might not othetwise occur. The FISC should be reformed to include a public advocate lobbying on behalf of privacy concerns, making the process genuinely adversarial and strengthening the FISC against charges that it merely rubber stamps applications from the intelligence community. 190 Article III courts need to follow the lead of Judge Leon in Klayman in conceptualizing privacy as broad and defensible, even in a world where electronics-based communication is dominant and relatively easy for the government to collect. If the judicial defense of privacy were combined with the possibility of liability for violations of that privacy, it is likely that this would incentivize increased self-policing among the members of the intelligence community. The creation of an active PCLOB and a more adversarial process before the FISC will not provide a perfect solution to the dilemmas posed by the government's legitimate need for secrecy and the protection of the public against potential abuse. Yet because these changes are institutional and structural, they are well-placed to improve the dynamic between the intelligence community, oversight mechanisms, and the public.
CONCLUSION
Genuine accountability should not depend on the chance that an unauthorized and illegal leak will occur. In the comparative example of the United Kingdom, engagement with a European Union energized with a commitment to increase privacy protections, along with domestic parliamentary oversight, provide two potential avenues for increased constraint on surveillance. In India, the parliament and the courts historically enabled, not constrained, the intelligence community. Whether that stance will continue as the government's technological capabilities increase is yet to be seen. Domestically, it could be argued that the types of reform recommended here to improve actual accountability and transparency over programs like the NSA Metadata Program are overkill: They involve multiple branches of government, the PCLOB, and the public. However, much of the accountability apparatus that has been in place was dormant until the Snowden disclosures, and would have remained passive without those disclosures. A multi-faceted, long-term, structural approach 189 In other national security contexts, it is clear that government officials would refuse to engage in potentially illegal behavior without the "golden shield" of protection against civil and criminal liability. See to improving transparency and accountability--one that involves at a minimum the courts and the PCLOB, but hopefully Congress, the executive branch, and the public as well-improves the likelihood of sustained and meaningful accountability as new surveillance capabilities are developed and implemented.
